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Abstract
Faced with the energy transition imperative, governments have to decide about
public policy to promote renewable electrical energy production and to protect domestic power generation equipment industries. For example, the Canada – Renewable
energy dispute is over Feed-in tariﬀ (FIT) programs in Ontario that have a local content requirement (LCR). The EU and Japan claimed that FIT programs constitute
subsidies that go against the SCM Agreement, and that the LCR is incompatible with
the non-discrimination principle of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This paper
investigates this issue using an international quality diﬀerentiated duopoly model in
which power generation equipment producers compete on price. FIT programs including those with a LCR are compared for their impacts on trade, profits, amount of
renewable electricity produced, and welfare. When ‘quantities’ are taken into account,
the results confirm discrimination. However, introducing a diﬀerence in the quality of
the power generation equipment produced on both sides of the border provides more
mitigated results. Finally, the results enable discussion of the question of whether
environmental protection can be put forward as a reason for subsidizing renewable
energy producers in light of the SCM Agreement.
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Introduction

Energy transition has important implications for international trade.1 The equipment
required for the generation of renewable energy sources is being produced by newly developed industries (e.g., solar photovoltaic industry) which have emerged to attack the
challenges of global warming and higher oil prices. In the context of energy transition,
the development of domestic industries to produce equipment for renewable energy export
appears strategic. Governments are tempted to design policies to support the development
of these sectors. However, specific protection of domestic industries could lead to trade
policies that potentially violate the non-discrimination principle which is the cornerstone
of World Trade Organization (WTO) international law.
This situation has already arisen as evidenced by seven trade disputes brought to the
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body.2 These trade disputes account for 14.5% of the total
of disputes occurring in the period December 2010 (date of the first of the 7 disputes) to
December 2013. Around two-thirds of them are disputes between newly industrialized and
industrialized countries. The nature of these seven trade disputes is mostly complaints
about national programs that provide support for the development of renewable energy
and preferential use of domestic over imported rival products.
One reason for the significant share of disputes related to energy is the increasing
use of Feed-In Tariﬀ (‘FIT’) programs in order to develop and sustain renewable energy
sources. FIT programs provide guaranteed prices for renewable energy supplied to the
grid through long-term contracts. The guaranteed price is set higher than the wholesale
market price for energy supplied from non-renewable sources. This guarantee helps oﬀset
the higher costs faced by renewable energy producers. By removing the cost disadvantage,
the objective of FITs is to foster investment and innovation in renewable energy sectors,
and they have emerged as one of the most popular green policies. For instance, Steer
(2013) points out that more than 50 developing countries have adopted FIT or renewable
energy standards to foster green technologies. In Europe, between 1990 and 2011, 23
EU members implemented FIT schemes to support the development of photovoltaic and
onshore wind power (Jenner et al., 2013). Jenner et al. (2013) is the first econometric study
of FIT eﬃcacy in Europe. The authors find that European FIT policies have driven solar
1

Energy transition in the European Union has the following objective of 20% renewable energy in overall

European energy consumption by 2020. Renewable energy sources include wind, solar, geothermal, wave,
tidal, hydropower, biomass, landfill gases, sewage treatment plant gases, and biogas.
2
In chronological order, these disputes are: Canada – Renewable Energy (DS412), China – Measures
concerning wind power equipment (DS419), Canada – Feed-In Tariﬀ Program (DS426), European Union
and a Member State – Certain Measures Concerning the Importation of Biodiesels (DS443), India – Certain
Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules (DS456), and European Union – Certain Measures on
the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry (DS459). For
further details, see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm
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photovoltaic capacity growth but argue that this eﬀect is overstated by not controlling
for country characteristics and specific designs. Smith and Urpelainen (2014), in a study
based on 26 industrialized countries from 1979 to 2005, show that FIT schemes have
caused large increases in renewable electricity generation. Borenstein (2012) and others
criticize the relevancy and eﬃciency of FITs partly because they believe that they may
lead to increased consumption of electricity and act as disincentives for energy eﬃciency.
Therefore, the design of renewable energy programs is of prime importance.
In Canada – Renewable Energy (DS412 and DS426), Japan and the European Union
complain about the FIT program implemented by the Canadian Province of Ontario which
guarantees the purchase price (i.e. at higher than the wholesale market price) of wind and
solar electricity production.3 The FIT program was implemented in 2009 to diversify
Ontario’s supply-mix and to help replace the generation capacities that would be lost by
2014 due to closure of coal-fired facilities in Ontario. According to the plaintiﬀs, these
programs make the award of a contract allowing guaranteed prices for renewable electricity subject to a Local Content Requirement (LCR) in the production facilities. More
precisely, to qualify for the FIT rate, 50% to 60% of power generation equipment should be
manufactured in the Province of Ontario. The complaints focus on two issues: i) breach
of the non-discrimination principle, and ii) creation of subsidies restricting competition.
First, by benefiting only electricity producers whose facilities meet the criterion of national content, the LCR policy treats imported and domestic power generation equipment
asymmetrically, and goes against the GATT 1994 Agreement principle of national treatment.4 Second, by guaranteeing a purchase price for electricity produced from renewable
sources higher than the wholesale price, the FIT program constitutes a subsidy within the
meaning of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).5
Most of the economic literature on FIT programs is empirical and investigates the
impact of this policy in several countries, or assesses the eﬃciency of some specific designs.6 However, Edenhofer et al. (2013)’s survey on the economics of renewable energy
sources calls for analysis of policy instruments tackling the welfare issue. From this per3
4

See Cosbey and Mavroidis (2014) for a legal overview of the case.
Despite the controversial nature of LCRs, they have been used in both developing and developed

countries. Governments oﬀering benefits for use of locally-produced goods in their renewable energy
programs include among others Brazil, China, Croatia, Greece, India, Italy, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine (Wu
and Salzman, 2013). For an analysis of the LCRs in India’s National Solar Mission, see Sahoo and Shrimali
(2013).
5
See Rubini (2012) for a discussion of the legal uncertainty surrounding the treatment of subsidies
within the WTO.
6
See, e.g., Chua et al. (2011) for Malaysia; Huang and Wu (2011) for Taiwan; Pirnia et al. (2011) and
Yatchew and Baziliauskas (2011) for Ontario; Mabee et al. (2012) for Ontario and Germany, and Antonelli
and Desideri (2014) for Italy. Although they find some design and implementation issues, most studies
point to the positive eﬀects of the FIT program on the development of renewable energy production.
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spective, our study is the first to present a theoretical model that allows comparing FIT
programs with and without LCR. We show that FIT programs without LCR are beneficial to power generation equipment suppliers and increase the total amount of renewable
energy produced. The impact on domestic welfare is ambiguous and depends mostly on
the social cost of public funds. Upstream suppliers largely capture the FIT as a subsidy, and even the foreign supplier may benefit from the program. Furthermore, results
confirm discrimination with LCR but, under certain conditions, the foreign supplier may
also gain. Interestingly, we show that the total amount of renewable energy produced
may decrease under a FIT program with LCR, in contradiction with the energy transition
objective. Our results shed light on the Canada – Renewable Energy dispute ruling and
broader open research questions at the intersection of trade, energy, industry policy, and
the environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model.
Section 3 investigates the eﬀects of FIT schemes within this framework. Section 4 introduces the LCR into FITs. Section 5 discusses the results and oﬀers some concluding
remarks and policy implications.

2

The Model

We consider a standard vertical product diﬀerentiation duopoly model in which two manufacturers – domestic and foreign – produce renewable energy power generation equipment.
Take the example of solar panels that convert sunlight to electricity. Pillai and McLaughlin (2013) provide an analysis of the solar module industry and show that it is a far from
perfectly competitive industry. Section 2.1 presents the two markets involved in the model
(an upstream manufacturing duopoly and the renewable electricity market) and the regulator’s objective. Section 2.2 resolves the unregulated equilibrium that constitutes our
benchmark model for the analysis of the FIT programs in succeeding sections.

2.1

The power generation equipment and electricity markets

Power generation equipment diﬀers only in quality. There are two rival technologies in
the solar industry – crystalline silicon modules, and thin film modules – which result in a
diﬀerent marginal product.7 Equipment purchasers are renewable energy producers. The
domestic renewable energy supply consists of numerous individual small producers. These
producers take the electricity price and the price of power generation equipment as given.
Also, an impartial regulator aims at increasing domestic supply of electricity produced
from renewable energy sources.
7

For further details on solar technologies, see, e.g., Sahoo and Shrimali (2013).
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Power generation equipment producers.

We assume that power generation equip-

ment is produced by two– domestic and foreign– firms competing in the domestic market.
The two manufacturers diﬀer in output quality and production costs. The costs of producing power generation equipment are assumed to be a quadratic function of the power
generation equipment quality (the power generation equipments marginal product Γ) and
′

′

′′

actual demand Q: ci (Γi , Qi ) for i = d, f where ci (Γ) > 0, ci (Q) > 0, ci (Γ) > 0, and
′′

ci (Q) > 0 (see, e.g., Moorthy (1988)). Whenever necessary, we will use the following form
for the cost function
ci (Γi , Qi ) = a Γ2i Q2i ,

for

i = d, f

with a > 0 .

(1)

Power generation equipment producers d and f compete on price à la Bertrand in the
market.8 Prices are denoted kd and kf (ki > 0 with i = d, f ).
Renewable electricity producers.

In the domestic economy, a continuum of potential

renewable electricity producers is considered. The size of each generating facility is assumed to be fixed (normalized to 1 unit of power generation equipment). The production
from each generating facility depends on two elements: the marginal product of power
generation equipment Γ (which is positive Γ ∈]0, ∞[) and an exogenous parameter θ denoting the diﬃculty involved in producing electricity due to natural conditions (e.g., low
wind speeds, sunshine hours, etc.).
Electricity producers are heterogeneous on θ which is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
The electricity production of a given plant is therefore assumed to decrease with θ. The
marginal revenue of one producer running a generating facility using equipment with
marginal product Γ is p (1 − θ) Γ, where p is the given price of the electricity sold (p > 0).
One unit of power generation equipment costs k. Other costs of production (variable
cost) are assumed to be negligible. Under these assumptions, the (marginal) profit of a
generating facility is given by the expression:
p (1 − θ) Γ − k .

(2)

A producer’s willingness-to-pay for one unit of power generation equipment with a
marginal product Γ is p (1 − θ) Γ. This willingness-to-pay increases in Γ and decreases in
θ. Given p, θ, (Γd , kd ), and (Γf , kf ), a renewable electricity producer can choose among
producing one unit of electricity using power generation equipment d, producing one unit
of electricity using power generation equipment f , or not producing.
Two critical levels θd and θf can be defined equating the profit of producing electricity
8

Cournot competition is also a possible option though less realistic.
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to zero:9
θi = 1 −

ki
pΓi

for

i = d, f .

(3)

Using power generation equipment i = d, f is profitable as soon as θ ≤ θi .10
The marginal electricity producer is indiﬀerent about power generation equipment
quality Γd at price kd and power generation equipment quality Γf at price kf when the
electricity price is p is such that:
θe = 1 −

kd − kf
.
p (Γd − Γf )

(4)

Throughout the rest of the paper we suppose that Γd > Γf . This assumption avoids
the situation where a domestic subsidy is given to the less eﬃcient technology under a FIT
program with LCR.11 When the domestic power generation equipment is more eﬃcient
than the foreign equipment (Γd > Γf ), producers for which θ is smaller than θe prefer the
domestic power generation equipment and those for which θ is bigger than θe prefer the
foreign power generation equipment. Note that θe can be outside of [0, 1].
e θ and θ can be stated and will be useful to analyze the
A result on the position of θ,
d
f

structure of demand for the two types of power generation equipment.

Lemma 1 If the marginal product of power generation equipment d is higher, Γd > Γf ,
e whereas θ is smaller than θ when θ < θ.
e
then θf is greater than θd when θd > θ,
f
d
d

The proof is given in the Appendix 
The structure of the demand for power generation equipment in the domestic market
can now be specified when Γd > Γf . The following settings can emerge: i) no power
generation equipment is purchased because the electricity production is not profitable,
ii) either domestic or foreign power generation equipment is produced (monopoly cases),
iii) both types of power generation equipment are purchased, with the critical values for
θ ordered as follows: 0 < θe < θd < θf . In the rest of the paper we consider only this
duopoly case as illustrated in Fig. 1.
e
The demands for power generation equipment are therefore Qd = θe and Qf = θf − θ.

Note that in this market setting θf denotes renewable electricity market coverage. Because
θi < 1 (i = d, f ), the market is never fully covered.
9

Note that these critical values are always smaller than 1 and can be negative.
Insuﬃcient rate of return is therefore the only reason for non-adoption.
11
This assumption is not necessarily realistic. However, it allows working with a scenario where the FIT
10

program with LCR should not be automatically rejected. See Sections 4 and 5 for a discussion.
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Figure 1: The duopoly market structure

The regulator. An impartial regulator aims at maximizing total domestic welfare. In
the domestic economy, we consider that the production of renewable energy compared
to fossil fuels or nuclear generations is small.12 Renewable generation is assumed (realistically) to cost more than non-renewable generation. Furthermore, the structure of
demand for renewable energy power generation equipment above shows that there are
always potential electricity producers that choose not to produce at all. In this context,
and because of the objective to initiate energy transition, the regulator aims to foster
renewable electricity supply in the market.
The domestic market electricity price is exogenous and given. This price may be
insuﬃcient to incite suﬃcient numbers of renewable electricity producers to enter the
market. The regulator aiming at developing the oﬀer of renewable energy in the market
in order to maximize domestic welfare, can oﬀer a higher price, pg > p, implementing a
FIT program (see Sections 3 and 4). The diﬀerence between the guaranteed price and the
market price, pg − p, can therefore be considered a subsidy.
We assume that an increase in the amount of renewable energy decreases the production
of fossil electricity. Unlike fossil fuel generation, renewable energy is assumed to imply
no external costs. As a consequence, developing renewable electricity (i.e., reducing nonrenewable generation) with the subsidy pg − p always decreases the external cost of nonrenewable energy. In the model, this relation is considered assuming that the external
cost of fossil generation of electricity is negatively linked to the total purchase of the
power generation equipment used in the production of green electricity (cf infra). Since
θf denotes renewable electricity market coverage in the duopoly situation, the external
cost is formalized as γ/θf , where γ > 0 is a scale factor.13 Note however, that this subsidy
should not be considered a policy aimed primarily at reducing pollution. Consequently,
the subsidy (or the choice of pg ) is not modified by taking account of the marginal cost of
pollution abatement. Finally, subsidizing renewable energy development requires public
funds, and therefore its social marginal cost must be considered.
12

This assumption is quite realistic, since for instance conventional fossil-fuel and nuclear generators

provided 87% of U.S. electricity in 2011 (Schmalensee, 2013).
13
Therefore, it is a decreasing function of the renewable electricity market coverage.
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2.2

Unregulated equilibrium

The domestic and foreign firms compete on price à la Bertrand. They determine power
generation equipment prices and produce the output that meets electricity producers’
demands.
Demands. When 0 < θe < θd < θf , both firms producing power generation equipment
have positive demands and form a duopoly:
kd − kf
,
p (Γd − Γf )
kd Γ f − kf Γ d
Df (kd , kf ) = θf − θe =
.
pΓf (Γd − Γf )
Dd (kd , kf ) = θe = 1 −

(5)
(6)

Profits. Using expressions (1), (5), and (6), the two profit functions are given by:
Πd (kd , kf ) = kd Dd (kd , kf ) − c (Γd , Dd ) ,

(7)

Πf (kd , kf ) = kf Df (kd , kf ) − c (Γd , Df ) .

(8)

The two firms compete on price choosing kd and kf non-cooperatively, anticipating the
competitors price. Since each profit function Πi (k) = Πi (ki , kj ), for i = d, f , j = d, f ,
i ̸= j, is continuous in k and is concave in ki for each value of kj , an equilibrium point
exists.
The maximization of the two profits functions gives the following best-response price
functions:
kd (kf ) =
kf (kd ) =

(Γd (2aΓd + p) − pΓf ) (p (Γd − Γf ) + kf )
,
2Γd (aΓd + p) − 2pΓf
Γf (Γd (2aΓf + p) − pΓf )
kd .
2Γd (Γd (aΓf + p) − pΓf )

where power generation equipment prices are strategic complements (best-reaction function slopes are positive), as illustrated in Fig. B.1. Solving kd (kf ) and kd (kf ) gives the
(unique) unregulated Nash equilibrium, (kd∗ , kf∗ ). The resulting equilibrium quantities
Dd∗ = θ̃∗ and Df∗ = θf∗ − θ̃∗ are derived using demand functions (5) and (6). Note that, as
expected, both firms are active in the domestic market.
Let us illustrate these results by choosing the following parameter values that comply
with the duopoly setting: a = 10, Γd = 50, Γf = 35, and p = 10. Plotting the respective
best-response price functions, we find the equilibrium level to be (kd∗ , kf∗ ), i.e. kd∗ ≈ 461.50
and kf∗ ≈ 317.34 (Fig. B.1 in the Appendix).
Finally, equilibrium profits are easily computed using (7) and (8). Equilibrium results
are therefore functions of all the exogenous variables: p, Γd , Γf , and the cost parameter
a. For the sake of clarity the equations for the exposition equilibrium are not included
here.14
14

Expressions are available upon authors’ request.

7

Surplus of the electricity producers.

Two types of electricity producers can be dis-

tinguished, those that use domestic power generation equipment at price kd and those that
use foreign power generation equipment at price kf . One can therefore compute the total
surplus of electricity producers as follows
∫θ̃∗

CS =

θ∗

(p (1 − θ)Γd − kd )dθ +

∫f

(p (1 − θ)Γf − kf )dθ ,

(9)

θ̃∗

0

with power generation equipment prices at their equilibrium value (kd∗ , kf∗ ). Note that, as
expected, the total surplus CS is an increasing function of the electricity price p.
Total amount of renewable energy. One can compute the total amount of renewable
energy, denoted kw, produced at equilibrium (i.e., with θe and θf calculated with kd∗ and
kf∗ ):

kw = kwd + kwf
∫θe

=

(1 − θ)Γd dθ +

∫θf

(1 − θ)Γf dθ .

(10)

θe

0

Unsurprisingly, like the consumer surplus CS, kw grows with the market electricity price p.
Domestic welfare. Total domestic welfare Wd is computed as the sum of the domestic
power generation equipment producer’s profits and the electricity producers surplus, minus
the external cost of fossil generation of electricity referred to at the end of Section 2.1:
Wd = Πd + CS −

γ
.
θf

(11)

It is straightforward to show that domestic welfare at equilibrium grows with the electricity price p and both types of power generation equipment quality, Γd and Γf . However,
in Section 3 we show that if the increase in the electricity price is due to the FIT program
and if one considers the Social Marginal Cost of Public Funds (SMCF),15 domestic welfare
may decrease with the guaranteed price.
In the following two sections we investigate the impact of a FIT program explored
in two variants, i.e. applied to both types (domestic and foreign), and one type (i.e.,
15

SMCF measures “the loss incurred by society in raising additional revenues to finance government

spending” (Dahlby, 2008, pp.1). In practice, for instance, Beaud (2008) provides general equilibrium
estimations of λ around 1.20 in France. In other words, 1 euro of spending by the French Government
actually costs 1.20 euro.
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LCR) of power generation equipment sold in the domestic market. We compare both
situations to the benchmark setting in Section 2 and make diﬀerent propositions relative
to market characteristics such as power generation equipment prices, consumer surplus,
and welfare.16 If analytical solutions become intractable, we will use numerical simulations
to illustrate some properties and comparative statics results.

3

The Use of Unconditional Feed-in Tariﬀs

The market price for electricity is often considered insuﬃcient to fully amortize the specific
power generation equipment used in renewable electricity generation. Therefore, guaranteeing a certain price level for renewable electricity promotes the production of this type
of electricity. Numerous countries have implemented such policies in the energy transition context (Antonelli and Desideri, 2014, e.g.). There is no consensus in the economic
literature. Country specificities such as economic and solar radiation conditions, and the
design of the schemes will aﬀect investment in renewable energy sources.
In the analysis below, we focus on two types of FIT schemes. In the first, the price
is ensured irrespective of the power generation equipment used for electricity generation
(most frequent scheme, used, e.g., in France and Germany). In the second, the guaranteed
price is conditional on the ‘local content’ of the electricity generation, i.e. on the use of the
domestic power generation equipment. This is a LCR exemplified by the WTO dispute
between Canada versus Japan and EU mentioned earlier. For example, under Ontario’s
FIT program, government pays high fixed prices for electricity produced with renewable
energy sources but only if producers use a certain level of locally-produced components.
This section investigates the eﬀects of unconditional FITs. The introduction of a LCR in
this scheme is analyzed in the next section.

3.1

Feed-in tariﬀ equilibrium

In order to promote renewable electricity generation, a guaranteed price pg above the
market price p, pg > p, is set by the regulator. Under the chosen policy, the (marginal)
profit of a generating facility becomes:
pg (1 − θ) Γ − k .

(12)

The critical values for θ therefore change by substituting p for pg . Thus, demand for
both types of power generation equipment is expressed as:
16

One could consider the benchmark as the situation where no power generation equipment (and no

renewable energy) is produced because of lack of profitability. However, this setting might excessively
favor the FIT programs in the comparison.
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kd − kf
,
pg (Γd − Γf )
kd Γf − kf Γd
Df g (kd , kf ) = θf − θe =
.
pg Γf (Γd − Γf )
Ddg (kd , kf ) = θeg = 1 −

Equilibrium prices on the power generation equipment market are aﬀected by these changes
in demand.
Proposition 1 Following unconditional feed-in tariﬀs, the prices of both national and
foreign power generation equipment producers rise at the equilibrium level.
The proof is given in the Appendix 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward: since the guaranteed price is
higher than the market price for electricity, electricity producers have a higher willingness
to pay for both types of power generation equipment. This situation allows power generation equipment producers to increase their prices. This result is illustrated using the same
parameter values as before, in order to simulate the eﬀect of a FIT of pg = 15 (market
price remains at p = 10). In line with Proposition 1, both equilibrium power generation
∗ ≈ 667.463 and k ∗ ≈ 455.057 (see Fig. B.2 in the
equipment prices appear higher, kd,g
f,g

Appendix).

Proposition 2 Guaranteeing a price for renewable electricity higher than the market price
for electricity has the following three eﬀects: i) an increase in market coverage θf , ii) an
increase in demand for the domestic power generation equipment, and iii) an increase in
demand for the foreign power generation equipment but only if the market electricity price
and the gap between the prices of the domestic and the foreign power generation equipment
are not too high:
p < 2a ψ (Γd , Γf )

and

kd∗ − kf∗ < 2a φ (Γd , Γf ) ,

where φ (Γd , Γf ) and ψ (Γd , Γf ) are two positive functions of Γd and Γf .
The proof is given in the Appendix 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. Because the guaranteed price pg is
higher than p, some electricity producers using foreign power generation equipment under
p will find it profitable to use domestic rather than foreign power generation equipment
(increase of θe with p), while others will find market entry attractive using the foreign power

10

generation equipment (the rise of θf with p). Therefore, the demand for foreign generation
power equipment increases in p only if the existing producers switching to domestic power
generation equipment are less numerous than the producers entering the electricity market
and running their installations using the foreign power generation equipment. Proposition 2 states that this result holds only if two conditions are met simultaneously. First,
the diﬀerence in power generation equipment prices cannot be larger than a threshold
which depends on the power generation equipment qualities. This condition reveals that
the gap between domestic and foreign power generation equipment qualities cannot be too
large.17 Second, the FIT pg cannot be too high, in order to avoid a situation where the
producers that would use foreign power generation equipment under p but domestic power
generation equipment under pg become too numerous.
We denote kwg as the total amount of renewable energy the FIT program. kwg is
computed as in the expression (10) with θe and θf calculated using the new equilibrium
prices.
Corollary 1 The production of renewable energy in the domestic country increases under
a FIT scheme.
The proof is given in the Appendix 
The rise in renewable energy production under a guaranteed price results from the
increase in market coverage (increase of θf ) and from the fact that under a guaranteed
price more producers choose the more eﬃcient power generation equipment (increase of
e
θ).

3.2

Surplus and domestic welfare

The results of a guaranteed price for renewable energy can also be assessed in relation to
profits and welfare. We can show that whatever the parameter values under duopoly constraints, the power generation equipment producers’ profits and the electricity producers’
surpluses rise following implementation of an unconditional FIT.

Proposition 3 Under a FIT program, power generation equipment producers’ profits and
electricity producers’ profits rise.
17

Remember that the conditions to maintain a duopoly (i.e., 0 < θe < θd < θf ) are such that a positive

diﬀerence in power generation equipment quality (Γd > Γf ) must be translated into a positive diﬀerence
in power generation equipment prices at equilibrium (kd∗ > kf∗ ). An important gap between kd∗ and kf∗
therefore, reveals an important diﬀerence in the power generation equipment qualities.
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The proof is given in the Appendix 
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is straightforward. First, guaranteeing a price pg
higher than the market price for electricity p increases the profits of both power generation equipment producers since the profit functions are strictly increasing in p. Second,
the electricity producers fall into two categories: those using domestic power generation
[

]

equipment located in the segment 0; θe , and those using foreign power generation equip[

]

e θ . Implementing a FIT program pushes up θe and θ . The
ment found in the segment θ;
f
f

rise in θe means that at least one producer θ finds it more profitable to use domestic than
foreign power generation equipment. As a consequence, the profit of each producer under
this θ increases under a FIT program. The rise of θf means that at least one producer
θ finds it profitable to enter the market and produce using the foreign power generation
equipment. As a consequence, the profit of each producer using foreign power generation
equipment under this θ increases under a FIT program. These two eﬀects imply that electricity producers’ total profits increase when a guaranteed price higher than the market
price is proposed.
This first series of results suggests a positive eﬀect of the FIT program. However, the
impact of the guaranteed price on total domestic welfare is a major disadvantage. Since
the implementation of a FIT program needs public funds, welfare (11) can be expressed
as follows:
Wd,g = Πd + CS −

γ
− λkwg (pg − p) ,
θf

(13)

where λ > 1 stands for the SMCF and kwg corresponds to the new expression from (10).

Proposition 4 Domestic welfare may decrease under the FIT program.
Corollary 2 There does not exist any pg that maximizes domestic welfare.
The proofs are given in the Appendix 
Proposition 4 and Corollary 2 question the economic rationale of the FIT program
especially when domestic welfare is decreasing. These results highlight one of the main
inconveniences attached to subsidizing renewable electricity generation in order to reduce
fossil fuel generation.18 In eﬀect, some electricity producers would produce in the absence
of a subsidy and would receive a subsidy under a FIT program. Therefore, in this model
public funds are expended without any increase in the supply of renewable electricity, since
producers are assumed to use only one unit of power generation equipment. Furthermore,
the external cost economy becomes ever less important as renewable electricity market
18

See Jaﬀe et al. (2005) and Fischer and Newell (2008).
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coverage increases while the marginal social cost of public funds remains constant. These
results show that welfare maximization does not resolve the question of where to set pg .
Note that the target of maximizing renewable energy production to fix pg does not help
since the production of renewable energy is increasing with the electricity price (Corollary 1
and Fig. B.4 in Appendix). Thus, political motivations are central in deciding about
implementation of this type of regulatory scheme.
A numerical simulation of the eﬀects of a FIT is given in Table 1.
Characteristics

Benchmark

Unconditional FIT

kd

461.502

667.463

kf

317.344

455.057

Dd

0.0389453

0.0559718

Df

0.0543583

0.0772527

Πd

9.10042

19.032

Πf

8.78026

18.0472

CSd

1.12013

3.4449

CSf

0.517094

1.5666

kwd

1.90935

2.72027

kwf

1.77674

2.44807

0.0199535

-9.3043

W

Table 1: Simulation of the eﬀects of a FIT Program
(a = 2.34, Γd = 50, Γf = 35, γ = 1, λ = 1, p = 10, and pg = 15)

The values chosen for the parameters a, Γd , Γf , γ and λ, illustrate the results demonstrated in Propositions 1-2: increases in power generation equipment prices, profits, and
renewable electricity produced following implementation of an unconditional FIT program.
Note that there is no international competition issue involved in this policy since the
profits of both competing power generation equipment producers’ increase under the FIT
scheme. Another perspective is oﬀered if FIT schemes are conditional on a LCR.

4

Feed-in Tariﬀs with LCR

In a conditional FIT program, benefiting from a guaranteed price depends on a LCR.
Specifically, the electricity price pg is ensured only for renewable electricity producers using
domestic power generation equipment, while the producers using foreign power generation
equipment obtain the market electricity price p.
Therefore, the critical values for θ change compared to their values in the benchmark
scenario. p is substituted for pg only if it refers to the domestic power generation equip-
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ment producer. Under the assumption of a duopoly setting,19 both demands for power
generation equipment result in the following expressions:
kd − kf
,
pg Γd − pΓf
kd − kf
kf
Df,cg (kd , kf ) = θf − θeg =
−
.
pg Γd − pΓf
pΓf
Dd,cg (kd , kf ) = θeg = 1 −

∗
∗ . The
We can then deduce equilibrium power generation equipment prices kd,cg
and kf,cg
∗
∗ .
demands for power generation equipment at equilibrium are denoted Dd,cg
and Df,cg

Proposition 5 Under the conditional FIT program, the price of the domestic power generation equipment always increases compared to the unregulated equilibrium, while the
change in the price of the foreign good is ambiguous.
The proof is given in the Appendix 
Proposition 5 highlights the fact that the producer of domestic power generation equipment always charges higher prices under a conditional FIT scheme. In contrast, the LCR
disadvantages the foreign producer in the domestic market. Maintaining a duopoly set∗
ting, in some circumstances may require a reduction in kf,cg
compared to the unregulated
∗
case. The simulations below show that kf,cg
is more inclined to decrease when LCR is

used (see Fig. B.3 in the Appendix).

Proposition 6 Compared to the unconditional FIT scheme, introducing a LCR has two
opposite eﬀects. First it increases demand for the domestic power generation equipment
only if two conditions are satisfied, p < aκ (Γd , Γf ) and pg < ξ (a, Γd , Γf ), where κ (Γd , Γf )
and ξ (a, Γd , Γf ) are positive functions of Γd and Γf defined in the Appendix. Second, the
LCR has a negative impact on the demand for foreign power generation equipment.
The proof is given in the Appendix 

Corollary 3 (foreign producer) The LCR does not necessarily lead to a reduction in
the foreign power generation equipment producer’s profit.
The proof is given in the Appendix 
19

Note that the introduction of the LCR could lead to a domestic monopoly. We do not consider this

case where discrimination is obvious.
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Proposition 6 throws light on the LCR in a FIT program from two diﬀerent perspectives. First, it shows that the LCR can be considered a strategic trade policy. The
discrimination it implies results in a reduction in the demand for foreign power generation
equipment in the domestic market. Note that if the duopoly assumption is relaxed at the
extreme, the LCR could lead the foreign power generation equipment producer to exit the
market.
When demand for both types of power generation equipment (Proposition 6) decrease,
there is a reduction in the renewable energy generated. Therefore, unlike the unconditional
FIT program, the LCR can lead to an outcome that is opposite to the energy transition
objective, as stated in the following Corollary.

Corollary 4 The production of renewable energy in the domestic country may decrease
under a FIT program with a LCR.
The proof is given in the Appendix 
A numerical simulation of the eﬀects of the FIT program with a LCR is given in
Table 2. The results show a decrease in the foreign power generation equipment producers
variables (price, demand, profit) and an increase in these variables for the domestic power
generation equipment producer. In this parameter setting, the introduction of the LCR
decreases the total amount of renewable electricity produced in the domestic country.
Characteristics
kd

Unconditional FIT

Conditional FIT

667.463

688.875

kf

455.057

311.648

Dd

0.0559718

0.0569318

Df

0.0772527

0.0526462

Πd

19.032

20.2577

Πf

18.0472

8.46221

CSd

3.4449

2.2645

CSf

1.5666

0.485033

kwd

2.72027

2.76556

kwf

2.44807

1.68921

W

-9.3043

-8.39254

Table 2: The eﬀects of a FIT program on market characteristics
(a = 2.34, Γd = 50, Γf = 35, p = 10, pg = 15, γ = 1, and λ = 1)

Second, Proposition 6 shows that the FIT program with a LCR should not be considered as automatically favoring the domestic power generation equipment producer. The
15

demand for domestic power generation equipment can decrease compared to the benchmark scenario. Simulations from Table 3 below illustrate this type of result where the
foreign firm’s profits do increase following the setting of a LCR FIT scheme. Depending on the parameter values, the introduction of such programs may increase the foreign
power generation equipment producer’s profit. In this scenario, equilibrium power generation equipment prices are higher compared to the unconditional FIT and obviously to the
benchmark. The total amount of renewable electricity produced in the domestic country
also decreases (see Graph B.4 in the Appendix).

Characteristics

Benchmark

Unconditional FIT

Conditional FIT

kd

83.33

115.12

220.50

kf

38.88

51.46

63.44

Dd

0.555

0.575

0.551

Df

0.347

0.338

0.290

Πd

38.580

57.984

113.957

Πf

11.574

15.592

17.060

CSd

154.321

241.195

177.932

CSf

24.112

34.395

16.836

kwd

20.061

20.497

19.965

kwf

3.761

3.454

3.524

215.906

188.767

166.596

W

Table 3: The eﬀects of a FIT Program on market characteristics
(a = 0.01, Γd = 50, Γf = 40, γ = 1, λ = 1.2, p = 10, and pg = 15)

5

Discussion

This paper investigates the consequences of a FIT program in the context of energy transition, using an international quality diﬀerentiated duopoly model in which power generation
equipment producers compete on price. The results can be applied to a discussion of the
Canada – Renewable Energy case. The ruling of this dispute was based on two main
points: National treatment and subsidies. In this dispute, the LCR was found incompatible with the GATT principle of National Treatment since it discriminated between
domestic and foreign power generation equipment in favor of the former. The results of
our model confirm this idea as long as ‘quantities’ are taken into account in a duopoly
setting.20 Proposition 6 establishes that, as a result of such a regulatory scheme, demand
for domestic power generation equipment does increase, whereas demand for the foreign
20

Discrimination would be obvious if the LCR created a domestic monopoly (see footnote 19).
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power generation equipment decreases. However, introducing a diﬀerence in the quality
of the power generation equipment produced on both sides of the border questions the
discrimination. First, the simulations show that a rise in the profits of the foreign power
generation equipment producer can be due to the LCR in a FIT program (see Table 3).
In this case, treating the two producers diﬀerently should not be considered ‘damaging’
discrimination. Second, a decrease in the demand for foreign generation equipment can
also emerge under the FIT Program without any LCR, as established in Proposition 2. In
this case, the LCR would exacerbate discrimination.
The question of whether the guaranteed price for electricity under Ontario’s FIT Program constituted subsidies was the subject of heated debate in the Canada – Renewable
Energy dispute. Under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, a “subsidy shall be deemed to
exist if there is a financial contribution by a government” conferring a ‘benefit’ to its recipient. The Panel tackled this problem by examining whether the FIT Program framework
gave an advantage to Ontario’s renewable electricity producers. On this issue, the Panel
considered that the guaranteed price for electricity should not give “more than adequate
remuneration” to the renewable electricity producers, and that this ‘adequacy’ had to be
assessed compared to regular market conditions. In line with previous rulings, the requirement was considered by the Panel as a context where supply and demand aﬀect price
even if the market is not perfectly competitive. Therefore, the question of what price can
be used as benchmark became central (rather than the LCR). The Panel refused to consider the wholesale price for electricity – which Japan and the EU had asked for – as the
benchmark because it clearly appeared that this price was distorted by the policy of the
Government of Ontario (acting simultaneously as a buyer and a producer of electricity).
Therefore, the Panel concluded that the claimants had failed to establish the existence
of subsidization.21 Against this background, a dissenting opinion of one Panel member
was recorded in the Panel’s Report. According to this member, the fact that every party
recognized that the guaranteed price fixed in the FIT Program is a condition for the existence of renewable energy producers, clearly shows that the FIT Program conferred a
benefit on these producers.
If the FIT program had been considered as constituting subsidies, the question of
whether these subsidies were prohibited would inevitably have been addressed. In light
of the Panel’s conclusion about national treatment, and Article 3 of the SCM Agreement
prohibiting subsidies contingent “upon the use of domestic over imported goods”, it is
highly likely that the FIT program would have been found incompatible with the SCM
Agreement, without consideration of its environmental dimension.
In the model, the FIT Program (whatever form it takes) is assumed to constitute subsi21

The Appellate Body reached the same conclusion but choosing the market for renewable energy rather

than the wholesale market as the benchmark.
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dies in light of the preceding debate: the guaranteed price is set higher than the wholesale
price. Nevertheless, we believe that this theoretical framework provides interesting insights
into the debate.
The first point that can be discussed is how subsidies are identified. In the vertical relation between power generation equipment producers and electricity producers, presented
in the model, Proposition 3 shows that subsidizing the latter clearly benefits the former
(with a ‘pass-through eﬀect’). The problem of protectionism that has to be addressed,
therefore rests on the power generation equipment not the electricity market. Japanese
and European electricity generators are not in competition with Ontario’s. Competition
is among power generation equipment producers. As a consequence, the eﬀects of the subsidies implied by the FIT program on prices, quantities, and profits, should be assessed
on the power generation equipment market where the LCR is potentially damaging.
The second point worth discussing is the way that LCR is excluded from the debate
over subsidies. Japan and the EU would not have claimed that Ontario’s FIT Program
constituted subsidies if the LCR had not been part of the FIT program. While this
requirement is therefore at the heart of the dispute, the Panel did not consider it when
discussing subsidies, to avoid the risk of ruling on FIT programs more generally (and
dangerously as we argue below). Our model shows that the FIT program without LCR
can distort trade (on the power generation equipment market), but not systematically
however.
Finally, the third point is the way the environment was excluded from the Panels
ruling. If one agrees with the dissenting Panel member’s view referred to above, the
question of justification for the subsidies is unavoidable: Can environmental protection
and energy transition be put forward as reasons for subsidizing renewable energy producers
in light of the SCM Agreement? Our model shows that the FIT Program with no LCR,
undisputably raises the production of renewable energy (Corollary 1). As Rodrik (2013)
argues, “industrial policies have an indispensable role in putting the global economy on
a green growth path.”22 What is the real weight of such an argument in this kind of
dispute especially in the face of discrimination? Should renouncing the LCR be seen as
the ultimate solution? Discussing the case, Cosbey and Mavroidis (2014) point out that
even with no LCR, FIT programs could be found incompatible with the SCM Agreement
since no attention is paid to the environmental protection motive in this Agreement.
This debate over the possibility of subsidies for environmental purpose takes place in a
particular context. During the first years of the WTO’s existence, such “green subsidies”
were possible under Art. 8 of the SCM Agreement. However, this article had a limited life
span of five years and was not extended. At the end of the day, the Panel and the Appellate
Body may have been wise in their approach to this issue. What would have happened
22

See also Rubini (2012).
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were the FIT Program to have been classified as an illegal subsidy without discussion of
the appropriateness of such a policy? The Panel would have been deciding a sensitive
issue on behalf of WTO Members. This would have questioned all the renewable energy
funding programs across Europe, Canada, and other countries. Were such a debate to
take place, the economic reasoning developed in our model clearly establishes the positive
characteristic of a FIT program (increased production of renewable energy) as well as
its main limitations, i.e. possible welfare reduction and eventual decreased production of
renewable energy if the LCR were adopted.
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A

Proofs of Lemmas, Propositions, and Corollaries

Most proofs use Mathematica 9.0 software. Computing codes and details are available
upon request.

A.1

Proof of Lemma 1

Consider the situation where power generation equipment d is the most eﬃcient: Γd > Γf .
kd Γf −kf Γd
> 0. As Γd > Γf , we must have
Γd (Γd −Γf )
k
kd
1 − pΓ
> 1 − pΓff , or ΓΓfd > kkfd . We therefore
d

Using (3) and (4) permits to write θd > θe as
kd
kf

>

Γd
Γf .

When θd is greater than θf , we have

e
have θf > θd when θd > θ.

Under the same reasoning we can show that θd < θe implies that

kd
kf

<

Γd
Γf

when Γd > Γf ,

so that we can deduce that we must have θd > θf .

A.2

Proof of Proposition 1

Both derivatives of kd∗ and kf∗ with respect to price p are always positive under the duopoly
constraint. As a consequence, the eﬀect of a price increase will always lead to a rise in power
generation equipment prices at equilibrium. Remember that power generation equipment
prices are strategic complements. If the domestic firm increases its price, the foreign rival’s
best strategy is to do the same.
In addition, the derivative of kd∗ with respect to price p is higher than the derivative
of kf∗ . In other words, ceteris paribus, an unconditional FIT has a larger impact on
the domestic power generation equipment price than on the foreign power generation
equipment price.

A.3

Proof of Proposition 2

Plugging the equilibrium prices kd∗ and kf∗ into the demand functions gives the two following
equilibrium demands for power generation equipment goods:

Dd∗ =

Df∗ =

2pΓd (Γd (p + aΓf ) − pΓf )
+ aΓd ) + Γd Γf (2aΓd (p + 2aΓd ) − 5p2 ) + pΓ2f (p − 2aΓd )

(A.1)

pΓd (Γd (p + 2aΓd ) − pΓf )
4pΓ2d (p + aΓd ) + Γd Γf (2aΓd (p + 2aΓd ) − 5p2 ) + pΓ2f (p − 2aΓd )

(A.2)

4pΓ2d (p

The derivative of Dd∗ with respect to p is always positive. Thus, guaranteeing a price
pg > p increases domestic demand for power generation equipment. The derivative of Df∗
with respect to p is positive only if two conditions are met simultaneously:
kd∗ − kf∗ < 2a φ (Γd , Γf )

and
22

p < 2a ψ (Γd , Γf ) ,

with φ (Γd , Γf ) and ψ (Γd , Γf ) having the following strictly positive values:

A.4

φ (Γd , Γf ) =

√

ψ (Γd , Γf ) =

v
u
u
t

1
2Γd −Γf
Γ3d Γf (Γd −Γf )

−

1
Γ2d

Γ5d Γf (2Γd − Γf )
Γ2d Γf
.
(
)2 + 2
2Γd − 2Γd Γf + Γ2f
(Γd − Γf ) 2Γ2d − 2Γd Γf + Γ2f

Proof of Corollary 1

The rise in renewable energy production under a guaranteed price results from the increases
e
in θf and θ.

A.5

Proof of Proposition 3

Guaranteeing a price pg higher than the market price for electricity p raises the profits
of both power generation equipment producers since the profit functions ki (p)Qi (p) −
Ci (Qi (p)) (i = d, f ) are strictly increasing in p at equilibrium.
The electricity producers fall into two categories: those using domestic power gener[

]

ation equipment located in the segment 0; θe l and those using foreign power generation
[

]

e θ . Implementing a FIT program pushes up θe and θ . The
equipment in the segment θ;
f
f

rise in θe means that at least one producer θ finds it more profitable to use domestic than
foreign power generation equipment. As a consequence, the profit of each producer under
θ increases under a FIT program. The rise in θf means that at least one producer θ finds
it profitable to enter the market and produce using the foreign power generation equipment. Thus, the profit of each producer using foreign power generation equipment under
θ increases under a FIT program. These two eﬀects imply that electricity producers’ total
profits increase when a guaranteed price higher than the market price is proposed.

A.6

Proof of the Proposition 4 and Corollary 2

The welfare expression defined in (11) is strictly increasing in p. However, the sign of its
second derivative is undefined. The amount that has to be spent to implement the FIT
program, λkwg (pg − p) is strictly increasing at a decreasing rate. As a consequence, the
welfare expression in (13) may be increasing in p (strictly or eventually after reaching a
minimum) or continuously decreasing in p. No pg maximizing the domestic welfare can
thus be determined.

A.7

Proof of Proposition 5

∗
∗
First, we can show that kd,cg
> kd∗ . Second, the inequality kf,cg
< kf∗ does not hold for all

parameter values. For clarity we do not provide the diﬀerent conditions under which the
above inequality holds. We provide Mathematica outputs for further details.
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A.8

Proof of Proposition 6

At equilibrium, the demand for domestic power generation equipment is the following:
(

∗
Dd,cs
(Γd , Γf )

)

2pg Γd pg Γd (p + aΓf ) − p2 Γf
(
)
(
)
= 2 2
4pg Γd (p + aΓf ) + p2 Γf pΓf − 2aΓ2d + pg Γd 4aΓ2d (p + aΓf ) − pΓf (5p + 2aΓf )
(A.3)

The impact on the demand for domestic power generation equipment of a LCR in a
∗
FIT can be calculated as Dd,cs
− Dd∗ with Dd∗ calculated at pg using equation A.1. The

positiveness of this diﬀerence is verified under two conditions:
p < aκ (Γd , Γf )

(A.4)

pg < ξ (a, Γd , Γf )

(A.5)

where κ and ξ are positive functions defined as following:
κ (Γd , Γf ) = √

4Γd Γf (2Γd − Γf )
4Γ4d + 8Γ3d Γf − 32Γ2d Γ2f + 28Γd Γ3f − 7Γ4f − 1
(

(A.6)

)

2apΓ2d + Γf p2 aΓd (p + 2aΓd )
ξ (a, Γd , Γf ) =
2Γd (aΓf + p)
√

+

4apΓ4d (aΓd +p)(2aΓd +p)−(Γd −Γf )4apΓ3d (2aΓd (aΓd +p)+p2 )
Γd −Γf

2Γd (aΓf + p)

√

(

)

(aΓd + p) (2aΓd + p) p2 + aΓd Γ2f (2aΓd − p)
+

A.9

2Γd (aΓf + p)

Proof of Proposition 6

At equilibrium, the demand for foreign power generation equipment is as follows:
∗
Df,cs
(Γd , Γf ) =

ppg Γd (Γd (pg + 2aΓd ) − pΓf )
(A.7)
4p2g Γ2d (p + aΓf ) + p2 Γf (pΓf − 2aΓ2d ) + pg Γd (4aΓ2d (p + aΓf ) − pΓf (5p + 2aΓf ))

The impact on the demand for foreign power generation equipment of a LCR in a FIT is
∗
computed as (Df,cs
− Df∗ ) with Df∗ calculated at pg using equation (A.2). This diﬀerence

is always negative.
Conditioning the FIT to LCR has an ambiguous eﬀect on the foreign firm’s profit.
As the intuition suggests, it is not always negative. The FIT can have a positive impact
(Π∗f,cg > Π∗f ) under the types of constraints below.
a < ā1 ,

with pg > p,

ā2 < a < ā3 ,

or,

with p < pg < p̄g .
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A.10

Proof of Corollary 4

Proposition 6 shows that the FIT program with a LCR systematically decreases the demand for foreign power generation equipment. Also, Proposition 6 shows that the program
increases demand for domestic power generation equipment only under certain circumstances. Therefore, the production of renewable energy may decrease under this program.
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Figure B.1: Nash equilibrium in power generation equipment prices
(a = 2.34, Γd = 50, Γf = 35, and p = 10)
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Figure B.2: Nash equilibrium in power generation equipment prices: The eﬀect of an
unconditional feed-in tariﬀ (a = 2.34, Γd = 50, Γf = 35, p = 10, and pg = 15)
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Figure B.3: Nash equilibrium in power generation equipment prices: Unconditional
versus conditional feed-in tariﬀs (a = 2.34, Γd = 50, Γf = 35, p = 10, and pg = 15)
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Figure B.4: The eﬀects of a FIT Program on the amount of renewable energy
(a = 0.01, Γd = 50, Γf = 40, γ = 1, λ = 1.2, and p = 10)
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